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European Central Bank working paper series 37Abstract
Societies provide institutions that are costly to use, but able to enforce long-run
relationships. We study the optimal decision problem of using self-governance for
risk sharing or governance through enforcement provided by these institutions.
Third-party enforcement is modelled as a costly technology that consumes re-
sources, but permits the punishment of agents who deviate from ex ante speciﬁed
allocations. We show that it is optimal to employ the technology whenever com-
mitment problems prevent ﬁrst-best risk sharing, but never optimal to provide
incentives exclusively via this technology. Commitment problems then persist and
the optimal incentive structure changes dynamically over time with third-party
enforcement monotonically increasing in the relative inequality between agents.
Keywords: Limited Commitment, Risk Sharing, Third-party Enforcement.
JEL Classifications: C73, D60, D91, K49.
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Modern societies have developed institutions such as official legal systems or private
arbitration systems that are costly to use, but able to enforce contracts or agreements between
people. In many situations, these enforcement institutions play a central role in governing
contractual relationships. This is despite the fact that the contracting parties have the choice of
self-governance directly through the structure of their contract. Our objective is here to study
the problem of choosing self-governance vs. governance through a third party.
Economic transactions within long-term relationships are carried out by self-interested parties
only if there is mutual interest in continuing the relationship. All transactions must, therefore,
incorporate proper incentives to ensure that all parties continue to participate over time. These
incentives are usually costly in the sense that they make it necessary to deviate from
transactions that are optimal for both agents from an ex ante point of view. It is here that
institutions can improve upon welfare by providing third-party enforcement: Agents involved
in a long-run relationship are free to choose whether to rely on such institutions rather than on
incentives through the structure of their agreement.
Given that these institutions are available but costly to use, the question then arises as to what
extent it is optimal for people to base incentive structures on these institutions. Are
commitment problems persistent in the sense that the parties of a relationship do not want to
rely exclusively on these institutions? Does the importance of outside (i.e., third-party)
enforcement change dynamically over time? If so, what are the fundamentals that shape the
dynamic evolution? Our contribution is to provide answers to these questions by analyzing
the optimal use of costly outside enforcement in a long-run relationship.
We study a dynamic risk sharing problem between two risk averse agents where commitment
is a priori limited. Each period the agents face idiosyncratic income shocks. From an ex ante
point of view, it is then optimal to transfer income ex post from an agent with high income
realization to an agent with low income realization. We assume, however, that both agents
cannot commit to make transfers they have agreed upon ex ante: At any point in time, each
agent can choose to renege on the transfer and leave the risk sharing arrangement. In our set-
up, incentives for the agents to honor transfers can be provided in two ways. First, agents can
use the structure of the risk sharing arrangement itself to provide these incentives.
Specifically, an agent can be induced to make a transfer of resources today if she is promised
more expected utility in the future. Second, agents can rely on a ￿punishment￿ technology
that formalizes enforcement through a third-party: Each period they can invest part of the
overall resources in this technology. If investment occurs, the technology allows one to
punish any agent who decides not to honor the transfer. This threat of punishment yields - for
a resource cost - enforcement of transfers.
We show that - as long as the technology is not too costly - it is optimal to employ the
technology whenever the agents have an incentive to deviate from first-best risk sharing. It is
never optimal, however, to provide incentives exclusively via this technology: The agents will
always rely upon varying future promised utility - or, equivalently, the consumption profile -
over time. Commitment problems are then only partially mitigated by using the technology
and, thus, are persistent in this sense.
This implies that the enforcement choice (as represented by the investment decision) depends
on the sequence of income shocks. Therefore, the optimal choice of punishment varies over
time and depends on the full history of income shocks. For the case of two possible income
realizations, we show analytically and numerically that more resources are spent on
punishment as the difference in promised utility increases for the agents. Hence, we exhibit a
positive relationship between inequality in future promised utility ￿ or the relative position of
the agents - and the use of third-party enforcement. In the long run, when agents have an
incentive to deviate from the first-best allocation, promised future utility is equalized
irrespective of the initial level of inequality between agents.
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Modern societies have developed institutions such as oﬃcial legal systems or private
arbitration systems that are costly to use, but able to enforce contracts or agreements
between people. In many situations, these enforcement institutions play a central role in
governing contractual relationships. This is despite the fact that the contracting parties
have the choice of self-governance directly through the structure of their contract. Our
objective is here to study the problem of choosing self-governance vs. governance through
a third party.
Economic transactions within long-term relationships are carried out by self-interested
parties only if there is mutual interest in continuing the relationship. All transactions
must, therefore, incorporate proper incentives to ensure that all parties continue to par-
ticipate over time. These incentives are usually costly in the sense that they make
it necessary to deviate from transactions that are optimal for both agents from an ex
ante point of view. It is here that institutions can improve upon welfare by providing
third-party enforcement: Agents involved in a long-run relationship are free to choose
whether to rely on such institutions rather than on incentives through the structure of
their agreement.
To govern relationships, third-party institutions (such as the legal system) are costly
to use as well. In essence, these institutions oﬀer a threat of punishment in the form
of ﬁnes or physical harm (e.g., imprisonment) in response to contractual violations, but
cannot force performance of the contract itself. Their eﬃcacy is based upon the ability to
credibly commit to inﬂicting punishment in an objective manner. Objectivity arises from
equal access as well as equal treatment of the parties involved in a relationship. Third-
party enforcement can then be interpreted as a costly technology that inﬂicts punishment
in case of contract violations, even though this view is abstracting from other important
factors such as limited eﬀectiveness, information problems or the incentives for these
institutions.
Given that these institutions are available but costly to use, the question then arises
as to what extent it is optimal for people to base incentive structures on these institutions.
Are commitment problems persistent in the sense that the parties of a relationship do not
want to rely exclusively on these institutions? Does the importance of outside (i.e., third-
party) enforcement change dynamically over time? If so, what are the fundamentals that
shape the dynamic evolution? Our contribution is to provide answers to these questions
by analyzing the optimal use of costly outside enforcement in a long-run relationship.
We study a dynamic risk sharing problem between two risk averse agents where
commitment is a priori limited in the spirit of Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Kocherlakota
(1996). Each period the agents face idiosyncratic income shocks. From an ex ante point
of view, it is then optimal to transfer income ex post from an agent with high income
realization to an agent with low income realization. We assume, however, that both
agents cannot commit to make transfers they have agreed upon ex ante: At any point
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arrangement. In our set-up, incentives for the agents to honor transfers can be provided
in two ways. First, agents can use the structure of the risk sharing arrangement itself
to provide these incentives. Speciﬁcally, an agent can be induced to make a transfer of
resources today if she is promised more expected utility in the future. Second, agents
can rely on a “punishment” technology: Each period they can invest part of the overall
resources in this technology. If investment occurs, the technology allows one to punish
any agent who decides not to honor the transfer. This threat of punishment yields - for
a resource cost - enforcement of transfers.
We show that - as long as the technology has convex costs and no ﬁxed costs - it is op-
timal to employ the technology whenever the transfers necessary to support ﬁrst-best risk
sharing are not incentive compatible. It is never optimal, however, to provide incentives
exclusively via this technology: The agents will always rely upon varying future promised
utility - or, equivalently, the consumption proﬁle - over time. Commitment problems are
then only partially mitigated by using the technology and, thus, are persistent in this
sense.
This implies that the enforcement choice (as represented by the investment decision)
depends on the sequence of income shocks. Therefore, the optimal choice of punishment
is history-dependent and inherently a dynamic one. For the case of two possible income
realizations, we show analytically and numerically that more resources are spent on
punishment as the diﬀerence in promised utility for the agents increases. Hence, we
exhibit a positive relationship between inequality in future promised utility - or the
relative position of the agents - and the use of third-party enforcement. In the long
run, when no ﬁrst-best allocation is incentive compatible, promised future utility is then
equalized irrespective of the initial level of inequality between agents.
Existing work on dynamic risk sharing with limited commitment1 takes the lack
of commitment as exogenously given and focuses exclusively on the eﬀects of optimally
designed incentives that arise within the risk sharing relationship. The structure of these
incentives is well understood. Kocherlakota (1996) characterizes eﬃcient risk sharing by
relying on reversion to autarky as the appropriate punishment if an agent reneges on a risk
sharing arrangement: Autarky is a credible punishment in the sense that it characterizes
the set of subgame-perfect allocations in bilateral risk sharing environments.2 More
recently, Genicot and Ray (2003) extend these results to a framework of risk sharing
within coalitions of agents. This paper goes further than this existing literature by
studying how agents choose optimally between internal incentives or incentives provided
through enforcement by a third party from outside the relationship. Hence, we study
per se the optimal degree of commitment within a risk sharing relationship.
1See for example Phelan (1995), Kocherlakota (1996), Alvarez and Jermann (2000) and Ligon et al.
(2003) among others.
2Gauthier et al. (1997) show that optimally designed ex ante payments between agents can help
reduce commitment problems. Ligon et al. (2000) investigate the role of self-insurance in form of
storage on the incentives to share risk over time.
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Parallel to our approach, Dixit (2003) outlines a theory of enforcement intermediaries.
He focuses on the role of third party enforcement in achieving cooperative outcomes in
a prisoner’s dilemma framework with random matching. The intermediary is modelled
close to our approach as a player that can inﬂict punishments on other players for some
positive fee. Ramey and Watson (2002) investigate the optimal form of contractual inter-
mediation or conﬂict resolution in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma. Whereas we take the
outside enforcement as given and investigate its optimal use by the contracting parties,
these authors concentrate on understanding the existing design of such intermediation.3
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the environment. In Section 3, we
describe the optimal contracting problem and derive its recursive formulation. Section 4
characterizes the optimal contract and contains the main results. In Section 5, we present
numerical examples concerning the optimal use of the punishment technology. Finally,
Section 6 concludes by discussing our modelling choices and puts our contribution into
a wider research context. All proofs appear in Appendix A, while Appendix B contains
a formal analysis of a result discussed in Section 4.
2 Environment
Consider the following environment where time is discrete and indexed by t =0 ,1,....
There are two inﬁnitely lived agents i =1 ,2, who receive each period a stochastic
endowment of a single good. Let ω = {ω1,ω 2,...} be a sequence of independently and
identically distributed random variables each having ﬁnite support Ω = {1,2,...,S}
and denote the probability of ωt equaling s by πs > 0 for all s ∈ Ω. Deﬁne a t-history
of ω by ωt = {ω1,ω 2,...,ω t} and let Ωt be the set of all possible t-histories of ω.
The endowment for agent i =1 ,2i np e r i o dt is determined by the realization of ωt and
denoted by yi
t,s ∈{ y1,y 2,...,y S} when ωt = s for t =0 ,1,.... We assume that y1




t,s = Y> 0 for all s ∈ Ωa n dt =0 ,1,... and that the joint distribution of the




and πs = πs .
Preferences for both agents are described over ωt-measurable consumption processes
ci ∈ C = {{ci
t}∞
t=0|ci
t :Ω t −→ [0,Y]} and represented by the utility function
3It is useful to distinguish our paper from Krasa and Villamil (2000) who study a static investment
problem with diﬀerential information, where enforcement of the ﬁnancial contract is a decision problem
for the lender. Enforcement of the contract is costly and the contracting parties will try to avoid it via
renegotiating the original contract whenever the lender cannot commit to seek enforcement of its terms.
While studying the optimal form of the ﬁnancial contract, the authors take the lack of commitment to
be exogenous (i.e., not to be a choice variable).










where β ∈ (0,1) and Et expresses the expectation conditional on a history of shocks
at date t. We assume that u is increasing, concave and twice continuously diﬀerentiable.
Furthermore, u is bounded from below with normalization u(0) = 0 and limc→0 u (c)=
∞.
Since the agents are risk averse and face idiosyncratic income shocks, there is an
incentive to share income risk. We assume, however, that enforcement of arrangements
to share risk is limited in the following sense: Each period, after uncertainty in period
t is resolved and the current endowment (y1
t,s,y2
t,s) is known, an agent i can choose to
remain in autarky forever. In this case, the agent will consume her endowment forever















where Vaut expresses the future expected utility from autarky which is independent
of the realized history of shocks.
When sharing income risk, the agents also have access to a “punishment” technology
that reduces an agent’s current and future utility in case this agent decides to remain
in autarky. Speciﬁcally, if this technology is operated at a level dt ∈ [0,1] in period t,
the agent loses a fraction dt of her current and future autarkic utility if she decides in
period t to remain in autarky forever.4 Operating this technology in period t at a level
dt requires an investment of resources equal to ψ(dt)i np e r i o dt which depreciates fully
after one period. We assume that the cost function ψ(·) is increasing, strictly convex
and does not include any ﬁxed costs:
Assumption 2.1. 1. ψ  ≥ 0 and ψ   > 0.
2. ψ(0) = 0 and ψ (0) = 0.
We assume further that the level of the punishment technology in any period t, dt,
is set before the current shock ωt is realized. Therefore, the level of punishment in
period t is independent of the current realization ωt but can depend on the past history
of realizations ωt−1.5 F o r m a l l y ,w ed e n o t et h eωt−1-measurable process of punishment
4Note that the severity of current and future punishment depends only on the level of dt, i.e., on
the level of punishment in the period when an agent decides to switch to autarky. Hence, a level of
punishment chosen in future periods has no inﬂuence on punishments for switching to autarky in earlier
periods.
5Third-party enforcement does then condition only on the fact whether contract violations occur or
not. In the formulation chosen here neither the identity of the violator nor her particular situation -
such as current income - matters for outside enforcement.
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t=0|dt :Ω t−1 −→ [0,1]},w h e r eΩ −1 is deﬁned to contain a single
element.
3 Describing Optimal Allocations
We formulate in this section the problem that describes optimal risk sharing between
the agents. To do so, we ﬁrst introduce some terminology. An allocation (c1,c 2,d) ∈
C×C×D is given by a consumption process for each agent and a process of punishment






t−1)) ≤ Y for all t,(ω
t−1,s). (3.1)
An agent will switch to autarky for a given state s at time t if the continuation
utility oﬀered by an allocation is less than the value of autarky given the current level




















for all t,( ωt−1,s).
Deﬁnition 3.1. An allocation (c1,c 2,d) ∈ C × C × D is ex post incentive compatible if
it satisﬁes inequality (3.2) for i =1 ,2 for all t,s. An allocation is incentive feasible if it
is feasible for all t,s and ex post incentive compatible for i =1 ,2 for all t,s.
We denote the set of incentive feasible allocations by Γ ⊂ C × C × D. Then, by
Assumption 2.1, Γ is convex6 and compact in the product topology. Next, let U be the
set of joint utility levels that can be attained by an allocation in Γ and denote by Ui the
range of utility levels of consumer i that is consistent with some allocation in Γ. The
following lemma establishes properties of the set of attainable utility levels. All proofs
are relegated to the appendix.
Lemma 3.2. 1. U⊂I R2 is compact.
2. Ui ⊂ I R is compact and U1 = U2.
Proof. See Appendix.
6Convexity follows from the concavity of u, the convexity of ψ and the fact that the ex post incentive
compatibility constraints at t are linear in dt.
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compatibility constraint (3.2) compares the expected utility of an allocation with the
utility obtain by choosing autarky forever and being punished by losing a fraction dt of
current and future utility. Remarkably, it is neither speciﬁed who pays the costs ψ(dt)
if nobody reverts to autarky nor who pays the costs if some agent does.
As long as neither of the agents chooses autarky, the distribution of costs is irrelevant
since for the utility attained by an allocation only the distribution of resources net of costs
ψ(dt) matters. This implies that it is always possible to recover the costs for operating
the punishment technology as long as the agents are participating. Of concern is then
that, given an agent chooses autarky, it might be optimal for the other agent to choose
autarky as well with the result that nobody would pay for the technology and it would
not be feasible to operate the technology. When describing incentive feasible allocations
this strategic interaction is, however, implicitly taken into account here since dt =0i s
always feasible.7
The concept of incentive feasibility allows us to deﬁne optimal allocations. An alloca-
tion (c1,c 2,d) ∈ C×C×D is optimal if there exists no other incentive feasible allocation
that provides both agents with at least as much expected utility at period 0 and at least
one of them with strictly more expected utility at period 0.
Deﬁne Vmin ≡ minUi and Vmax ≡ maxUi. We can then set up a modiﬁed Pareto-
problem that describes optimal allocations taking into account incentive feasibility. De-
ﬁne the function V :[ Vmin,V max] −→ [Vmin,V max] as the solution to the problem (SP):

























The function V refers then to the maximum level of expected utility agent 1 can
obtain for any incentive feasible utility level u0 ∈ [Vmin,V max] that must be guaranteed
for agent 2. Provided V is well deﬁned it is clearly decreasing, since any incentive
feasible allocation at ˆ ˆ u0 > ˆ u0 is also incentive feasible at ˆ u0. Concavity of this function
7Indeed it is possible to make these arguments analytically precise at considerable costs of complica-
tion: one can motivate constraint (3.2) by identifying the set of incentive feasible allocations with the
outcomes of a class of games formalizing repeated bargaining with voluntary participation where the
distribution of costs among the agents is speciﬁed and non-participating agents do not have to bear any
of the costs ex-post. This is achieved by establishing pay-oﬀ equivalence between the set of equilibria of
all possible games and U, i.e. the set of utility levels attainable through incentive feasible allocations.
For details see Koeppl (2002).
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is the maximum utility given u0. V is then also continuous and diﬀerentiable almost
everywhere. The next proposition shows that V is indeed well deﬁned and strengthens
some of these immediate results.
Proposition 3.3. 1. For all u0 ∈ [Vmin,V max], a solution to problem (SP) exists.
2. There is an interval [V ,V ] ⊆U 2,w h e r eV <V aut < V = Vmax, such that V is
strictly decreasing and strictly concave.
Proof. See Appendix.
We now restrict V to the subset [V ,V ] of its domain where it is strictly decreasing. By
symmetry, V :[ V ,V ] −→ [V ,V ]a n dV describes the Pareto-frontier. Hence, any solution
of the problem (SP) for given u0 ∈ [V ,V ] is an optimal allocation. Since u is strictly
concave, for every u0 ∈ [V ,V ] there exists a unique optimal allocation. Furthermore, for











for all u0 ∈ [V ,V ].
These facts allow us to use the methods introduced by Spear and Srivastava (1987)
and Thomas and Worrall (1988) to formulate the problem (SP) recursively. The state
variable for this approach is given by the level u0 of promised utility for agent 2.
Deﬁnition 3.4. A contract is given by a collection of functions ({cs,u s}S
s=1,d),w h e r e
d :[ V ,V ] −→ [0,1], cs :[ V ,V ] −→ [0,Y] for all s ∈ S and us :[ V ,V ] −→ [V ,V ] for all
s ∈ S.
A contract consists of functions that determine the current level of consumption and
the future expected promised utility for agent 2 for each state s, denoted by cs and
us respectively, as well as the level of punishment, denoted by d, in terms of the state
variable u0. The Pareto-frontier can then be determined recursively with the optimal
allocation being described by a contract.
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u(Y − cs − ψ(d)) + βV(us) ≥ (1 − d)[u(y
1
s)+βVaut] ∀s
u(cs)+βus ≥ (1 − d)[u(y
2
s)+βVaut] ∀s
us ∈ [V ,V ] ∀s.
Proof. See Appendix.
Since the value function V is strictly concave and the constraint set describing the
functional equation (FE) is convex, the solution to the above maximization problem is
unique for any state u0. Applying the Theorem of the Maximum, the optimal contract
can then be described by continuous functions for d, cs and us.




the functions d∗, c∗
s and u∗
s are continuous on [V ,V ].
Proof. See Appendix.
4 Optimal Contracts
4.1 Persistence of Limited Commitment
We use now the problem (FE) to characterize the optimal contract. This allows us
then to analyze the decision concerning the use of the punishment technology. Let λ be
the multiplier on the promise-keeping constraint and µi
s the multiplier on the ex post
incentive compatibility constraint for agent i in state s. Assuming that the function V
is diﬀerentiable everywhere with respect to u0, we obtain the following set of ﬁrst order




 (Y − ψ(d) − cs)+( λπs + µ
2
s)u




 (us)+( λπs + µ
2
s)β =0 ( 4 . 2 )










s)+βVaut] − (πs + µ
1
s)u
 (Y − ψ(d) − cs)ψ









s)+βVaut] − (πs + µ1
s)u (Y − ψ(d) − cs)ψ (d)

=0 .
A brief comment about equations (4.1)-(4.4) is in order as we omit some of the cor-
responding Kuhn-Tucker conditions on the decision variables. For u0 ∈ (V ,V )i ti s
optimal to make current consumption strictly positive for both consumers for all states
(i.e., Y − ψ(d) >c s > 0), and hence boundary conditions will never bind for cs. Hence,
it is never optimal to set d = 1 and we can restrict attention to d ∈ [0,1). Finally, rear-
range equation (4.3) to obtain an expression for ψ (d) which shows that this expression
will always be non-negative. Hence, even if d = 0, equation (4.3) will hold with equality.
With respect to us the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are standard and, hence, omitted here.




u (Y − ψ(d) − cs)
u (cs)
. (4.5)
It is immediate that given d, us >u s  if and only if cs >c s . Hence, u∗
s is an increas-
ing function of c∗
s, or, equivalently, current consumption and future utility are varying
together across states. A major complication arises from the fact that this equation
depends also on the choice variable d.I f d were constant over the state space [V ,V ],
this equation (together with the ex post incentive compatibility constraints for state s)
would determine the dynamic evolution independently for each state s ∈ S.I fd varies,
however, the system of equations becomes genuinely dependent in the sense that one
cannot conduct the analysis for each state separately.
The evolution of the state variable u0 depends on which ex post incentive compatibil-
ity constraints are binding for a given state s. The following lemma summarizes results
concerning the law of motion of u0.
Lemma 4.1. Let u0 ∈ (V ,V ) and suppose that V is diﬀerentiable at u0. Then the
following hold:
1. If µi
s(u0)=0for all i,t h e nu∗
s(u0)=u0.
2. If µ1
s(u0) > 0 and µ2
s(u0)=0 ,t h e nu∗
s(u0) <u 0.
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s(u0) > 0 and µ1
s(u0)=0 ,t h e nu∗
s(u0) >u 0.
4. Suppose −V  (u0) ≤ 1 and µ1
s(u0)µ2
s(u0) > 0.I fy2
s >y 1
s,t h e nu∗
s(u0) >u 0.
5. Suppose −V  (u0) ≥ 1 and µ1
s(u0)µ2
s(u0) > 0.I fy1
s >y 2
s,t h e nu∗
s(u0) <u 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
This determines the optimal variation of future promised utility except for cases where
the ex post incentive compatibility constraints are binding for both agents simultaneously
in some state s. In this case, the direction of the movements for u0 can be ambiguous.
Based on Lemma 4.1 it is possible to describe at least partially which agent’s ex post
incentive compatibility constraint is binding: If only one of the agents faces a binding
constraint at some income level, he receives more future utility than he was promised
initially. Since u∗
s is increasing in c∗
s, this agent must receive even more future utility at
higher income levels. This is compatible with the ﬁrst order conditions only if the agent
is constrained at higher income levels. Hence, agents tend to be constrained when their
income is high and, thus, have a strong reason to choose autarky over staying with the
contract. This intuition is formally summarized in the lemma below.
Lemma 4.2. 1. Suppose u∗
s(u0) >u 0 for some s.I fy2
s  >y 2
s,t h e nµ∗2
s  (u0) > 0.
2. Suppose u∗
s(u0) <u 0 for some s.I fy1
s  >y 1
s,t h e nµ∗1
s  (u0) > 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Two main questions arise concerning the use of the punishment technology within the
optimal contract. First, under what circumstances and to what extent is it optimal to use
the punishment technology to achieve better risk sharing among the agents? Second, how
does the decision concerning the use of the punishment technology vary endogenously
over time?
From Lemma 4.1 it is clear that the state variable remains unchanged for some state
s ∈ S as long as none of the incentive constraints in this state is binding. We can
distinguish two cases depending on whether the ﬁrst-best allocation at u0 is incentive
feasible or not. For the ﬁrst case, µi
s = 0 for all i and s and, hence, from equation (4.3),
d∗ = 0. Turning to the case where the ﬁrst best allocation at u0 is not incentive feasible,
at least some ex post incentive feasibility constraint is binding. Again by equation
(4.3), it follows that d∗ > 0a sl o n ga sµi
s > 0 for some i and some s.8 Beyond these
straightforward observations it is possible to give a stronger result on the use of the
punishment technology.
8Note that assuming ψ (0) = 0 is essential for this result. In the case that ψ (0) > 0, one might not
want to use the punishment technology when a ﬁrst-best allocation is not incentive feasible, but rather
rely exclusively on internal incentives by setting u∗
s  = u0.
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exists s ∈ S such that u∗
s(u0)  = u0 if and only if d∗(u0) > 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
This theorem makes several important points. First, the agents will never rely exclusively
on the technology that provides punishment to deal with limited commitment. Enforce-
ment problems are always mitigated by a combination of using the explicit threat of pun-
ishment (d∗ > 0) and implicit incentives provided through variations in future promised
utility (u∗
s  = u0). Hence, any optimal contract will retain the commitment problem to a
certain degree and counteract it by the intertemporal allocation of consumption between
the agents. In this sense, commitment problems are persistent.
Second, the state variable u0 will change with the realization of income shocks even
though the punishment technology is employed. Thus, the distribution of wealth as
summarized by u0 varies over time and does not remain ﬁxed. This implies that decisions
concerning the use of the punishment technology are path dependent and vary over
time due to changes in the wealth distribution. Therefore, the choice of enforcement is
inherently a dynamic problem and cannot be treated as an ex ante static problem.
4.2 Punishment and Inequality
We turn now to the second question of how the level of punishment changes over time
as the state variable u0 evolves endogenously. Since the environment is symmetric with
respect to the characteristics of the two agents, it is possible to restrict attention to
the case where u0 ≤ u or V (u0) ≥ u0,w h e r eu ∈ [V ,V ] such that u = V (u). If the
ﬁrst-best allocation for u0 is incentive feasible, the contract is completely characterized
by Theorem 4.3. We therefore turn to the case where the ﬁrst-best allocation at u0 is
not incentive feasible.9
As inequality increases - i.e., as |u0 − u| increases - it is more diﬃcult to sustain
eﬃcient risk sharing since the outside option of leaving the arrangement becomes more
attractive on average. Risk sharing has then to be supported by stronger incentives.
These can be provided in two diﬀerent ways: One can either increase |us − u0| (i.e.,
provide more indirect incentives via future promised utility) or one can invest more in
the punishment technology. However, using more indirect incentives decreases future
risk sharing on average. One should therefore expect that investment in the punishment
technology would rise to at least partially counteract the negative eﬀects on risk sharing.
In other words, punishment should behave like a “normal” good in terms of inequality
(in symbols, |u0 − u|) and substitution between the ways to provide incentives should
not take place.
9It is straightforward to show that - independent of income shocks - for all β ∈ (0,1), there exists
some level u0 for which the ﬁrst-best allocation is not incentive feasible.
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therefore assume for the reminder of the analysis in this section that there are only two
states - i.e., S =2w i t hS = {H,L} - representing the current level of income for agent
2, where y2
H >y 2
L. Before characterizing the optimal choice of punishment as a function
of the state variable u0, we derive the following lemma:10
Lemma 4.4. Suppose S = {H,L} and u0 < u.I fa tu0 the ﬁrst-best allocation is not




Whenever agent 2 is promised less utility than agent 1, at least one of her incentive
compatibility constraints must be binding. Since there are only two states, Lemma 4.2
implies that her constraint when she has high income must necessarily bind. This fact
allows us to prove the following monotonicity result for d∗ which conﬁrms the intuition
outlined above for the case in which for some u0 the ﬁrst-best allocation is incentive
feasible.
Theorem 4.5. If S =2 , the policy function d∗(u0) is monotone on [V ,u].
Proof. See Appendix.
Corollary 4.6. Suppose that for some u0 the ﬁrst-best allocation is incentive feasible. If
S =2 , the policy function d∗(u0) is monotonically decreasing on [V ,u] and monotonically
increasing on [u,V ].
Proof. See Appendix.
When inequality increases, it is optimal to decrease overall consumption and devote
more resources to ensure enforcement of the risk sharing arrangement. Even though
Corollary 4.6 establishes this result only for the case when some ﬁrst-best allocation is
incentive feasible, numerical solutions described in more detail below conﬁrm this result
for the general case.
This result can be interpreted in a slightly diﬀerent way. Suppose that one of the
agents has higher bargaining power than the other. Then this agent has an interest in
maintaining her position and is willing to spend more resources on outside enforcement.
This enables her to at least partially lock in the relative position by keeping us “closer” to
u0. When the diﬀerence between the relative positions (i.e., |u0−u|)i n c r e a s e s ,i ti sh a r d e r
to maintain the current position, and more resources are spent on outside enforcement.
Interestingly, however, Theorem 4.3 shows that outside enforcement is always too costly
for the agents to maintain a current advantage in their bargaining power over time.
10Even though the value function is not diﬀerentiable at u0 = u if S = 2, none of the results in
this section is aﬀected by this non-diﬀerentiability. Moreover, if S =2 ,u∗
s(u)=u, which shows that
diﬀerentiability is necessary for the validity of Theorem 4.3.
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Having characterized properties of the optimal contract, the question arises how the
relationship between the agents develops in the long run. Of particular interest is how
the relative position of the two agents adjusts in the long run and whether convergence
to an invariant distribution over the state space occurs. We focus ﬁrst on the two-state
case. Later, we discuss what assumptions are necessary to derive a slightly weaker result
for the case of an arbitrary ﬁnite number of states.
Before stating the main result of this section, it is necessary to introduce some
notation. The stochastic process {ωt}∞
t=0 can be deﬁned over the probability space
(Ω∞,F∞,Π∞), where an event is a particular sample path of the process, the σ-algebra
F∞ is generated by the cylinder sets of the process, and Π∞ is the product measure
based on the probabilities {π1,π 2,...,π S}.
Given the optimal contract and an initial condition u0, for every sample path ω ∈ Ω∞
it is possible to construct a sequence {ut(ω;u0)}∞
t=0 of promised future utility levels for
agent 2. Set u1(ω;u0)=u∗
s(u0)i fs ∈ S is realized in period 0. Deﬁne ut(ω;u0) recursively
by setting ut(ω;u0)=u∗
s(ut−1)i fs ∈ S is realized in period t for all t>0. Moreover,
denote the set of promised utility levels for which some ﬁrst-best allocations is incentive
feasible by [uFB,u FB] ⊂ [V ,V ]. Suppressing the arguments of ut,w ec a nt h e np r o v et h e
following result on the long-run behavior of the optimal contract.
Theorem 4.7. Let S =2and suppose that u∗
s is non-decreasing.
1. If there exists a ﬁrst-best allocation that is incentive feasible, then for any optimal
contract, limt→∞ ut = uFB Π∞-a.s. whenever u0 <u FB and limt→∞ ut = uFB
Π∞-a.s. whenever u0 >u FB.
2. If there does not exist a ﬁrst-best allocation that is incentive feasible, then for any
optimal contract, limt→∞ ut =¯ u Π∞-a.s. for every u0 ∈ [V ,V ],w h e r e¯ u satisﬁes
¯ u = V (¯ u).
Proof. See Appendix.
Provided that there are only two states, for any initial condition u0 the stochastic process
for ut converges with probability 1 to a unique point distribution. Hence, the availability
of outside enforcement does not prevent the equalization of wealth between the agents
over time or, for the case that the set of incentive feasible ﬁrst-best allocations is non-
empty, convergence to the “closest” element of this set.11
11It is straightforward to show that d∗ being monotonically increasing in wealth inequality is a nec-
essary condition for u∗
s to be increasing. Moreover, the monotonicity assumption on u∗
s seems rather
weak since numerical solutions given below indicate that these functions are indeed increasing for a wide
range of parameterizations.
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two states and no ﬁrst-best allocation is incentive feasible. The optimal contract and
the exogenous process of shocks deﬁne a Markov transition function. Continuity of the
policy functions u∗
s establishes the Feller Property for this transition function. Moreover,
the transition function will satisfy a mixing condition whenever the value function V
is diﬀerentiable everywhere. Then standard results on weak convergence of Markov
processes (e.g., Stokey, Lucas with Prescott (1989), Theorem 12.12) yield convergence to
a long-run stationary distribution of wealth independent of initial conditions, provided
u∗
s is an increasing function of the state variable u0. We defer details of this argument
to the appendix.
To summarize our contribution, we have established three important theoretical re-
sults. First, commitment problems are persistent and not completely resolved by the use
of costly third-party enforcement. Second, more unequally distributed bargaining power
leads to greater reliance upon third-party enforcement. Last, the presence of third-party
enforcement never prevents adjustments to a long-run, possibly equal, distribution of
wealth across agents.
5 Numerical Solutions
The main analytical results of the previous section are derived under certain restrictions.
We now provide further support for the generality of these results by presenting some
numerical solutions for optimal contracts. Before presenting these results, we outline the
algorithm used to solve for the Pareto frontier and the optimal contract, and describe
how this algorithm can be implemented computationally.
The algorithm is based upon dynamic programming techniques. These methods are
generally not applicable when solving incentive constrained problems, since the value
function of the problem itself will inﬂuence the constraint set directly as can easily be
observed from problem (FE). Hence, the constraint set will change with every iteration
of the value function when solving the functional equation (FE). More importantly, the
domain of the state variables for which the maximization problem is well deﬁned will
change with each iteration as well. Rustichini (1998) demonstrates that one can modify
standard dynamic programming methods in a straightforward way to handle these prob-
lems. He shows analytically that one can iterate directly on a guess for the value function
in order to obtain convergence to the true value function of the incentive constrained
problem. Conditions for this result are that the value function iteration starts with the
value function of the unconstrained problem as an initial guess and that one adjusts the
domain of the state variables in an appropriate way. Given these conditions, convergence
is then monotonic from above to the true solution of the functional equation (FE). The
details of the algorithm we employ are as follows:
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Step 2: Adjust the domain Dn of the state variable u0 given the guess Jn for the value
function V .
Step 3: Solve the static maximization problem for each realization of the state variable
u0 given Jn. Use this result to update the guess to Jn+1.
Step 4: If supu0∈Dn(Jn(u0) − Jn+1(u0)) > >0, go back to Step 2.
Step 5: Use Jn+1 to calculate policy functions and ﬁnd the law of motion on Dn.
To calculate the initial guess start with the Pareto frontier (which can be calculated
analytically in a straightforward manner for any given utility function u) describing the
ﬁrst best solution of the risk sharing problem. Then deﬁne a new maximization problem
(PRE) by deleting the ex post incentive compatibility constraints for consumer 1 that
contain the value function V from problem (FE). Solve (PRE) by iterating over the value
function of this problem with the Pareto frontier as the initial guess to obtain the initial
guess for Step 1 of the algorithm above.12
To implement the algorithm described above, we discretize the state space for u0
and, hence, solve the functional equation for a ﬁnite number of values for u0 in each
iteration. The static maximization routine uses a linear quadratic approximation of the
maximization problem with a cubic spline interpolation of the value function to guarantee
twice continuous diﬀerentiability of the objective function. Finally, when computing the
optimal contract, we perform a grid search over the decision variables of the maximization
problem taking the solution of the value function as given.
Below we present the output of two examples that show the value function and the
optimal decision with respect to the level of punishment d∗ as functions of the state
variable u0. The utility function chosen is CES, u(c)=θc1−σ/(1 − σ), where σ ∈ (0,1)
and θ>0, to satisfy the assumptions of Section 2. Costs are described by ψ = χ · dζ,
where ζ>1a n dχ>0.
The ﬁrst example exhibits a situation where some ﬁrst-best allocation is incentive
feasible. The cost function is given by ψ =4 d2 and the Bernoulli utility function is
u(c)=
√
c. Other parameters are given by β =0 .8a n dys ∈{ 1.8,0.2}.F i g u r e 1
compares the frontier of ﬁrst-best allocations with the value function of problem (FE).
Whereas both functions coincide for ﬁrst-best allocations that are incentive feasible, the
12By using Blackwell’s suﬃcient conditions (e.g., Stockey, Lucas with Prescott (1989), Theorem 3.3)
it is straightforward to show that iteration over value functions of problem (PRE) is a contraction
operator. This ensures convergence to the “right” guess to apply the method of Rustichini (1998).
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to the axes. Nevertheless, it extends beyond the value of autarky which is given by
Vaut ≈ 4.4721 units of utility.
T h ee n f o r c e m e n tc h o i c ei sd e p i c t e di nF i g u r e2 .N o t et h a td∗ = 0 for the region where
the ﬁrst-best allocation is incentive compatible. The graph also depicts a lower and an
upper bound for the optimal decision d∗ on the interval [V ,u]. Figures 3 and 4 show the
levels of future promised utility u∗
s and the current consumption levels c∗
s as a function
of the state variable u0.
The second example has the same cost function as above. The other parameters are
changed to β =0 .6, θ =1 ,σ =0 .4a n dys ∈{ 1.5,0.5}. For these values, there does
not exist a ﬁrst-best allocation that is incentive feasible. The Pareto-frontier, therefore,
shifts inward relative to the value of ﬁrst-best allocations as shown in Figure 5.
The enforcement choice depicted in Figure 6 is strictly positive. Furthermore, the
policy function d∗ is increasing in wealth inequality, a result we obtained in our numerical
solutions for any parameterization. The non-diﬀerentiability of the value function at ¯ u
for S = 2 causes some numerical error which is reﬂected in the small diﬀerence between
the law of motion of both states at u0 =¯ u (cf. Figure 7).
Last, we stress that Figures 3 and 7 show that u∗
s is an increasing function of the
state u0, a result that can be conﬁrmed in numerical experiments for a wide range of
parameters. This gives us conﬁdence that the results concerning the long-run properties
of the optimal contract are true quite generally as the assumptions of Theorem 4.7 seem
to be satisﬁed with wide generality.
6 Concluding Remarks
Our analysis demonstrates that commitment problems persist even though the parties
sharing risk have access to costly third-party enforcement. This result is strong in the
sense that we impose rather weak restrictions on the cost structure, thereby giving the
use of enforcement the best possible chance. More importantly, even though the pres-
ence of ﬁxed costs will introduce a barrier to using third-party enforcement, persistence
depends only on the fact that costs are increasing in the use of punishments. As long as
this is the case, there are always incentives to avoid part of these costs by relying also
on intertemporal features of the contract. Since commitment problems become more
severe with increasing diﬀerences in the relative position of the agents, the monotonicity
property of optimal enforcement is not too surprising. However, it is striking that the
costs of keeping ﬁxed a speciﬁc positive level of inequality always outweigh the exist-
ing incentives to do so; the technology is never “abused” to lock in a speciﬁc level of
inequality.
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based on the violation of the contract (i.e., leaving the arrangement) disregarding other
circumstances like diﬀerences in current income. Second, if punishment depends on the
current realization of the shock, the incentives of the two agents are not properly aligned.
Whoever has a high income realization prefers a strictly lower punishment level than the
other agent. Hence, communicating the current income distribution to the outside would
be diﬃcult if not impossible. This problem does not occur if punishment next period
depends only on the new level of promised utility set endogenously by the agents in the
previous period. Future work should concentrate on modelling a non-cooperative game
between the agents and a third agent providing enforcement. It is then possible to study
not only the incentives of the third party, but also diﬃculties in the communication
between agents and the outside party.
By using a dynamic contracting approach for our analysis we are silent about any
initial condition that would pin down the dynamic evolution of the long-run relationship.
Since our description of the optimal contract is independent of any initial conditions, the
outcome of any ex ante bargaining procedure would simply consist of the optimal contract
described here evaluated at an initial condition reﬂecting the relative bargaining power
of the agents. By construction, there would be no incentives for the agents to violate
this contract at any later time.
A ﬁnal remark concerns decentralizing the environment. Optimal contracts could
be decentralized as a ﬁnancial markets equilibrium with complete markets and portfo-
lio constraints. These constraints mimic how stringent the incentive compatibility or
participation constraints for the optimal contract are. Since the agents choose the set
of feasible allocations in our problem, the value of the portfolio constraints must vary
dynamically over time as uncertainty is resolved. The decentralization should reﬂect
the optimal choice of enforcement and, hence, oﬀers a conceptually genuine theory of
endogenous portfolio constraints.13 The main diﬃculty clearly arises from the problem
of distributing the enforcement costs among the agents. The requirement here is to
construct either a market mechanism or a direct mechanism that distributes the costs
without disturbing the properly decentralized ﬁnancial decisions of the agents. A careful
analysis of this question seems to be a promising future research agenda.
Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 3.2:
1. Since U∈I R2, U is compact if and only if U is closed and bounded. Obviously,
U⊂[0,1/(1 − β)u(Y )]2 is bounded. Let un be a convergent sequence such that
13Alvarez and Jermann (2000) suggest a decentralization of an economy with exogenously given par-
ticipation constraints. Their borrowing constraint are “endogenous” only to the extent that they are
not completely arbitrary, but rather determined by the fundamentals of the economy.
We have assumed that enforcement cannot depend on the current realization of the
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(c1
n,c 2
n,d n) in Γ such that the n-th allocation generates the utility levels un for all n.
Since Γ is compact in the product topology, there exists a subsequence that converges
to an allocation (ˆ c1,ˆ c2, ˆ d) ∈ Γ. Since un converges to ˆ u, every subsequence of un also
converges to ˆ u. We can restrict the function u(·) in (2.1) to the interval [0,Y]; the
utility function deﬁned by (2.1) is then continuous in the product topology. Hence, ˆ u
is generated by the allocation (ˆ c1,ˆ c2, ˆ d) ∈ Γ. Thus, ˆ u ∈Uand U is closed.
2. For i =1 ,2, Ui is the projection of U into I R. Hence, Ui is compact. By symmetry,
U1 = U2.

Proof of Proposition 3.3:









Since U⊂I R2 is compact, the constraint set of (UP) is compact and by continuity
of the objective function, this problem has a solution in U. Thus, there exists an
incentive feasible allocation that attains these utility levels. Hence, the problem (SP)
has a solution for all u0 ∈ [Vmin,V max].
2. Suppose V is not strictly decreasing over [Vmin,V max]. Since V is concave and con-
tinuous, V is either constant over [Vmin,V max] or constant over a subinterval starting
from Vmin and strictly decreasing over the remainder of the interval. It is therefore
suﬃcient to show that V is strictly decreasing at Vaut, which is clearly an element of
U2.
Let u0 = Vaut. Suppose ﬁrst that at the optimal allocation some ex post incentive



















Hence, we can decrease c2
0,s and increase c1
0,s slightly without violating incentive fea-
sibility. Thus, there exists ˜ u0 <V aut such that V (˜ u0) >V(Vaut).
Suppose now that for the solution to (SP) given Vaut, all ex post incentive compatibility
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gives agent 1 a utility which is strictly higher than V (Vaut). Deﬁne the following two
functions for a given s ∈ S and given the optimal allocation:
f1( )=u(c
2


















1( )=−ψ ( )u (c2






.D e ﬁ n e B ≡
u (1
2c2
0,s). Optimality of the allocation and limc→0 u (c)=∞ yields c2
0,s > 0 and hence
B<∞.S i n c eψ (0) = 0, for   c l o s et o0 ,w eo b t a i n
f
 
1( ) < −Bψ
 ( ) <f
 
2( ) < 0.
Hence, there exists an incentive feasible allocation that gives u0 <V aut to agent 2 and
V (Vaut) to agent 1 such that some ex post incentive compatibility constraint for agent
2 is not binding at t = 0. Thus, we can construct an allocation where agent 2 obtains
˜ u0 <V aut and V (˜ u0) >V(Vaut). By concavity, V must then be strictly decreasing on
[˜ u0,V max].
Let ˆ u, ˆ ˆ u ∈ [V ,V ]a n dˆ u<ˆ ˆ u.L e t ( ˆ c1,ˆ c2, ˆ d)a n d( ˆ ˆ c1,ˆ ˆ c2, ˆ ˆ d) be the corresponding
solutions to problem (SP). Since V is strictly decreasing on [V ,V ], after some history
ωt,ˆ c1
t+1,s < ˆ ˆ c1
t+1,s. Strict concavity of u implies strict concavity of V .

Proof of Proposition 3.5:
Let u0 ∈ [V ,V ] be given and let (ˆ c1,ˆ c2, ˆ d) be an optimal allocation. Deﬁne (ˆ c1
1,s,ˆ c2
1,s, ˆ d1,s)
as the continuation allocation from t = 1 onwards when state s ∈ S occurred in period
t =0 .
Claim: The continuation allocation (ˆ c1
1,s,ˆ c2
1,s, ˆ d1,s)f r o mp e r i o dt =1o n w a r d sg i v e ns ∈ S
occurred in period t = 0 is an optimal allocation.
Suppose not. Then after s ∈ S occurs in period t = 0, there exists a continuation
allocation (˜ c1
1,s,˜ c2
1,s, ˜ d1,s)f r o mp e r i o dt = 1 that is feasible and yields at least as much
utility for both agents and strictly more utility for one agent than (ˆ c1
1,s,ˆ c2
1,s, ˆ d1,s), the
one speciﬁed in the optimal allocation. Deﬁne a new allocation by replacing the part
of the old allocation after the event s occurs in the ﬁrst period by (˜ c1
1,s,˜ c2
1,s, ˜ d1,s). This
allocation is clearly incentive feasible. Furthermore, it delivers at least as much utility
to both agents as the optimal allocation and strictly more expected utility for one agent.
Hence, (ˆ c1,ˆ c2, ˆ d) is not optimal, which is a contradiction.
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function in (FE).
Claim: V (u0) ≤ ˜ V (u0).
Let (ˆ c1,ˆ c2, ˆ d) be the optimal allocation given u0. Similarly, let (ˆ c1
1,s,ˆ c2
1,s, ˆ d1,s)b et h e
continuation allocation of the optimal allocation at t = 1 after s ∈ S occurred in period
t =0 .D e ﬁ n e





















Consider now the contract ({ˆ c2
0,s, ˆ us}S
s=1, ˆ d0). This contract is clearly feasible and ex post




Since {ˆ c1,ˆ c2, ˆ d} attains a utility of V (u0) for agent 1, it follows that ˜ V (u0) ≥ V (u0).
Claim: V (u0) ≥ ˜ V (u0).
Let ({ˆ cs, ˆ us}S
s=1, ˆ d0) be the solution to the right hand side of the objective function in
(FE) yielding ˜ V (u0). Since ˆ us ∈ [V ,V ] for all s ∈ S, there exists an optimal allocation








1,s, ˆ d, ˆ d1,s). The allocation is
incentive feasible for the problem (SP) and, since

s∈S πs[u(ˆ cs)+βˆ us]=u0, agent 2
receives utility u0. Since agent 1 receives

s∈S πs[u(ˆ cs)+βV(ˆ us)] = ˜ V (u0)f r o mt h e
allocation, V (u0) ≥ ˜ V (u0).

Proof of Proposition 3.6:
Since the constraint correspondence is compact-valued and continuous, the Theorem of
the Maximum (Debreu (1959), Theorem 1.8 (4)) applies. As V is strictly concave and
the constraint set is convex, the solution of the maximization problem is unique and,
therefore, given by unique policy functions d and cs, us for all s ∈ S.

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s = 0 for all i implies that −V  (us)=λ.B y t h e e n v e l o p e
theorem, λ = −V  (u0) and the result follows from the fact that V is strictly decreasing.








Hence, −V  (us) < −V  (u0). Since V is strictly decreasing and strictly concave, us <
u0.
3. The proof is analogous to the one given above.
4. If both ex post incentive compatibility constraints are binding in some state s,t h e y
must also be binding in the state s  where the income of both agents is reversed.
Otherwise, at least one of the agents can be made better oﬀ by replicating the contract
for state s  in state s. Hence the original contract cannot be optimal.
Thus, the allocations for the pair of states (s,s ) must be symmetric in the sense that
agent 1 receives agent 2’s allocation of state s in state s . Without loss of generality
assume that y2
s  >y 1
s .S i n c eus is increasing in cs for given d,w eo b t a i n
us  = V (us) >u s = V (us )
and
cs  = Y − ψ(d) − cs >c s = Y − ψ(d) − cs .
Strict concavity of V and symmetry of the problem imply −V  (us)=1i fa n do n l y
if V (us)=us.S i n c e us  >V (us )a n dV is strictly concave, −V  (us ) > 1. By
hypothesis, −V  (u0) ≤ 1. Hence, us  >u 0.
5. The proof is analogous to the one given above.

Proof of Lemma 4.2:
Let us >u 0 for some s ∈ S. By Lemma 4.1, µ2
s > 0 and the ex post incentive compat-
ibility constraint binds for agent 2 in state s.L e t s  be any state such that y2
s  >y 2
s.
Then, since us is increasing in cs, it must be the case that us  >u s >u 0. Hence, µ2
s  > 0.
The second statement is proved by an analogous argument.

Proof of Theorem 4.3:
Suppose d = 0. Then by equation (4.3), µi
s = 0 for all i =1 ,2a n da l ls ∈ S. By Lemma
4.1, us = u0 for all s ∈ S.
Proof of Lemma 4.1:
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s = 0 for
all s,t h e nd = 0 by equation (4.3), which is impossible. Hence, for some s, µi
s > 0 for
i =1 ,2.
Since Y − ψ(d)a n dus are constant across states, it follows from equation (4.5) that cs
is also constant across states. Thus, the utility levels for both agents are constant across
states. This implies that for each agent the ex post incentive compatibility constraint
can be binding for at most one income level. Since for all s ∈ S, y1
s  = y2
s,w eh a v eµi
s =0
for some i =1 ,2i na l ls t a t e ss. A contradiction is therefore obtained.

Proof of Lemma 4.4:
Since at u0 the ﬁrst-best allocation is not incentive feasible, at least some incentive
constraint must be binding and, by Theorem 4.3, d>0. It is also clear that all the




s = 0 for all s ∈{ H,L}.
Suppose not. Then there exists s ∈{ H,L} such that µi
s > 0 for i =1 ,2. Then, since
not all incentive constraints can be binding, µi
s  = 0 for some i and s   = s. Without loss
of generality, assume s  = L and µ1
L = 0. Then,
u(Y − ψ(d) − cL)+βV(uL) >u (cH)+βuH =( 1− d)[u(yH)+βVaut]
and
u(cL)+βuL ≥ u(Y − ψ(d) − cH)+βV(uH)=( 1− d)[u(yL)+βVaut].
Therefore, both agents receive higher or equal utility in state s  = L than in state s = H.
This cannot be optimal since one can replicate the contract for state s  = L in state s = H
and make at least some agent better oﬀ without making the other worse oﬀ.
Claim: µ1
s = 0 for all s ∈{ H,L}.
Suppose ﬁrst that µ1
H > 0 (i.e., agent 1’s incentive constraint binds when his income is
low). Hence uH <u 0. By Lemma 4.2, µ1
L > 0. By the previous claim, µ2
s = 0 for all s.
Thus, V (u0) <u 0, a contradiction.
Suppose now that µ1
L > 0 (i.e., agent 1’s incentive constraint binds when his income is
high). Then, by the previous claim, µ2
L = 0. Furthermore, µ1










which contradicts u0 < ¯ u.
By incentive feasibility,
u(cH)+βuH ≥ u(Y − ψ(d) − cL)+βV(uL)=( 1− d)[u(yH)+βVaut].
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both agents receive higher or equal utility in state s = H than in state s = L.T h i s
cannot be optimal since one can replicate the contract for state s = H in state s = L
and make at least some agent better oﬀ without making the other one worse oﬀ.
Claim: µ2
H > 0.
The previous claim implies that µ2
s > 0 for some s ∈ S.I fµ2
L > 0, uL >u 0. By Lemma
4.2, µ2
H > 0 which completes the proof.

Proof of Theorem 4.5:
We show that the policy function for d must be monotone on [V , ¯ u]. Symmetry implies
that it must be monotone - with the sign of the slope reversed - on the other part of
its domain. Without loss of generality, we assume throughout the proof that d(u0) > 0
(i.e., that at u0 the ﬁrst-best allocation is not incentive feasible). We proceed ﬁrst with
an intermediate result.
Claim: If µ2
s > 0 for all s ∈ S = {H,L} at ˆ u0,t h e nˆ ˆ d>ˆ d for all ˆ ˆ u0 < ˆ u0.
Suppose not. Then, there exists ˆ ˆ u0 < ˆ u0 such that ˆ ˆ d<ˆ d. By incentive feasibility,








s > 0 for all s ∈ S = {H;L} at ˆ u0,w eh a v e








ˆ ˆ u0 ≥ (1 − ˆ ˆ d)Vaut > (1 − ˆ d)Vaut =ˆ u0.
This is a contradiction.
Suppose now that the policy function is not monotone on a subinterval of [V , ¯ u]. Conti-
nuity implies that there exists ˆ u0 < ˜ u0 such that ˆ d = ˜ d>0. Since d is the same, strict
concavity of V and u imply that ˆ uH =˜ uH and ˆ cH =˜ cH. Using equation (4.3) and the
claim above, we obtain

s∈S[V  (ˆ u0) − V  (ˆ us)]γs






[V  (˜ u0) − V  (ˆ uH)]γH
u (Y − ψ(ˆ d) − ˆ cH)+u (Y − ψ(ˆ d) − ˜ cL)
,
where γs denotes the value of the outside option if income is given by ys.S i n c eˆ u0 < ˜ u0,




 (ˆ u0) − V
 (ˆ us)]γs > [V
 (˜ u0) − V
 (ˆ uH)]γH.
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have ˆ uL > ˜ uL =˜ u0. Since the allocation for state s = H is the same for ˆ u0 and ˜ u0,i t
follows that ˆ u0 > ˜ u0, which is a contradiction.

Proof of Corollary 4.6:
If there exists a ﬁrst-best allocation that is incentive feasible, d = 0 for some interval
[uFB,u]a n dd>0 for [V ,u FB). The result then follows.

Proof of Theorem 4.7:
1. Let u0 ∈ [V ,u FB). Deﬁne A≡{ ω ∈ Ω∞|ωt = H for ﬁnitely many t}. Clearly,
Π∞(Ac) = 1. Hence, limt→∞ ut = uFB Π∞-a.s. if limt→∞ ut = uFB for all ω ∈A c.
Let ω ∈A c. By Lemma 4.4 and the assumption that us is non-decreasing in u0,
{ut}∞
t=0 is monotonically non-decreasing. Since us(uFB)=uFB for all s ∈{ H,L} (cf.
Theorem 4.3), the sequence is bounded from above and, hence, must converge to a
limit.
Deﬁne m(u0)=maxsus(u0). Since ω ∈A c, for all T ∈ I N there exists t>Tsuch
that ut >m (uT). For T →∞ , u∗ ≥ m(u∗). From the deﬁnition of m(·) and Lemma
4.1, we have u0 <m (u0) for all u0 ∈ [V,u FB). Hence, limt→∞ ut = uFB for ω ∈A c.
The argument for u0 ∈ (uFB,V ] is analogous.
2. If us(¯ u)=¯ u for all s ∈{ H,L}, the result follows by an argument analogous to the one
given above. By Lemma 4.4, for all u0 < ¯ u, uH(u0) >u 0 and uL(u0)=u0. Conversely,




We give now a more rigorous analysis of the discussion following Theorem 4.7 in Section
4.3. We assume throughout that there is no incentive feasible ﬁrst-best allocation and
show that the distribution of wealth converges weakly to a unique long-run distribution
provided that u∗
s is non-decreasing.
Given an optimal contract, the state variable u0 follows an endogenous Markov process
that reﬂects the policy functions ({c∗
s,u ∗
s}S
s=1,d) as well as the exogenous Markov chain
of shocks wt. Formally, we can express this Markov process by a transition function Q∗.








1(u0),u 0)=Prob(B|ut−1)( B . 1 )
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maps the space of all bounded, B-measurable, real-valued functions into itself. This

















t−1))πs,( B . 2 )
where the function f is any bounded, B-measurable, real-valued function. To prove our
result we use the following mixing condition:
Condition B.1. There exists  >0 and T ∈ I N such that Prob(uT(V ) ≥ ¯ u) ≥   and
Prob(uT(V ) ≤ ¯ u) ≥  .
This condition can be interpreted in our context as follows. Suppose that u0 ∈{ V ,V };
i.e., in period t = 0 we have the highest possible degree of inequality. Given Condition
B.1, there is a positive probability that the initial inequality between agents is reversed
within in a ﬁnite number of periods.
Let F0 be any distribution function over [V ,V ]. Furthermore, denote by Ft the distribu-
tion function for ut given F0. We say that the sequence of distribution functions {Ft}∞
t=0
converges weakly to F (or Ft ⇒ F) if and only if limt→∞ Ft(u0)=F(u0)a te v e r yc o n t i -
nuity point u0 of F. The next result formally establishes weak convergence of the wealth
distribution to a unique invariant distribution by adopting an argument of Kocherlakota
(1996).
Lemma B.2. If V is diﬀerentiable everywhere, for all u0 ∈ [V , ¯ u] there exists s ∈ S
such that us(u0) >u 0 .
Proof. For u0 ∈ [V , ¯ u] some ex post incentive feasibility constraint for agent 2 must be




s(u0) > 0 the result follows. If µ1
s(u0)µ2
s(u0) > 0 there exists a state
s  such that µ1
s (u0)µ2
s (u0) > 0. Otherwise, one could replicate the allocation in s  for
s making one of the agents strictly better oﬀ. Since −V  (u0) ≤ 1 for all u0 ∈ [V , ¯ u],
the result follows then from the symmetry assumption on the endowment process and
Lemma 4.1.
Theorem B.3. If u∗
s is non-decreasing and V is diﬀerentiable everywhere, there exists
a unique distribution F such that Ft ⇒ F for any initial distribution F0.
Proof. By Proposition 3.6, u∗
s is continuous and, hence, the operator TQ∗ satisﬁes the
Feller Property. Furthermore, TQ∗ is monotone as u∗
s is assumed to be non-decreasing.
Since [V ,V ] is compact and TQ∗ preserves continuity, by Theorem 12.10 of Stokey, Lucas
with Prescott (1989) there exists an invariant distribution over [V ,V ] under the transition
function Q∗. Furthermore, by Theorem 12.12 of Stokey, Lucas with Prescott (1989), the
invariant distribution is unique and weak convergence from any initial distribution occurs
if TQ∗ is monotone and if Condition B.1 for the Markov transition function Q∗ is fulﬁlled.
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sequence {wn}∞
n=1 recursively by setting wn = m(wn−1)w h e r ew0 = V .
Suppose there does not exist N ∈ I N such that wN ≥ ¯ u. Since the sequence is non-
decreasing and bounded from above by ¯ u, it must converge to a limit ¯ w ≤ ¯ u.S i n c e
m is a continuous function, m(¯ w)= ¯ w. By Lemma B.2, we have m(u0) >u 0 for all
u0 ∈ [V , ¯ u]. A contradiction.
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Figure 1: Value Function

























Figure 2: Level of Punishment






























Figure 3: Law of Motion for u0
























Figure 4: Consumption Levels


















Figure 5: Value Function

























Figure 6: Level of Punishment

































Figure 7: Law of Motion for u0























Figure 8: Consumption Levels
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